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3I.
Americans enjoy one of the highest per capita standards of living in the history of
world, and no one doubts that “good institutions” have contributed mightily to this happy
outcome.  Private property rights are secured by a Constitution and a tradition of
common law, and enforced by an independent judiciary.  Elections are held at periodic
and predictable intervals, and transitions of government officials are routine and
generally without incident.  Within the boundaries of the United States there are
“common markets” in goods, currency, and factors of production.  Subject to certain
limitations, individuals have freedom of speech, freedom of movement, and other human
rights.  Government activities – taxation and the provision of public services – are
divided between local, state, and federal levels, ensuring a degree of competition and
experimentation.    Although the overall structure of these institutions is largely fixed,
their specific implementation has been, and continues to be, extraordinarily flexible.  
However, the history of the United States is not without its stains, of which race is
one of the most scarring and certainly, one of the most enduring.  Prior to 1865,
“securing private property rights” included securing the right to own another human
being in certain parts of the country.  Although in principle slavery could have been
divorced from skin color, in practice black Africans and their descendants were
overwhelmingly the enslaved and white Americans (with very few exceptions) were
overwhelmingly the slave owners.   Most whites, whether they were or were not slave
owners, accepted (or did not challenge) the racist ideology that blacks were “inferior”.  
An epic struggle ensued over whether slavery per se was moral, a struggle that
4culminated indirectly in a terrible Civil War.   Although the War ended slavery, the
ideology prevailed for much longer before coming under scrutiny and ultimately, change
for the better.
  This essay has two goals.  The first is to document changes over time in the
absolute and relative living standards of African-Americans, from slavery to the present.   
Economic historians – Robert Higgs among them -- have studied intensively the
economic history of African-Americans over the past several decades, and it is their
research that I survey here.   The second goal is to ask how “government” affected this
history, for better or for worse.  Both goals are impossibly large, and much of what I have
to say is necessarily broad-brushed and without nuance.  But it is the big picture that I am
after.  This picture has several key elements.
The first is that slavery, as it was practiced in the Southern United States before
the Civil War, was profitable and viable.   Slaves were valuable as productive assets. 
Consequently, the treatment that slaves received from the slave owners, in certain
material respects, compared favorably with that received by (some) free workers from
employers.  However, the slave system provided far fewer incentives for skill acquisition
and wealth accumulation by slaves than the corresponding “free labor” system did for
free workers.  Under slavery there was no possibility for slaves to participate in the
polity; and, it goes without saying, no freedom of movement or other constitutional rights
enjoyed by free persons.  The “rules of the game” permitted the economic benefits of
slavery to accrue, by design, to slave owners and to consumers of the products of the
slave economy, but not to the slaves.  On the eve of the American Civil War there is little
reason to believe, on economic grounds, that slavery was about to come to an end
5voluntarily, at least in the foreseeable future.   Although one can imagine different
histories, it was the Civil War that changed the rules of the game.
The second element is that, by and large, the economic history of African-
Americans since 1865 is a history of convergence.  African-Americans began the post-
Emancipation phase of their shared journey in a state of utter “relative backwardness” –
they were generally without artisan or managerial skills, almost completely devoid of
ownership of physical capital, and almost wholly without exposure to formal schooling.  
In the 140-odd years since the end of the Civil War, the black-to-white ratio of per capita
income has increased by a factor of three; that of wealth by a factor of seven; racial
differences in educational attainment today are small compared with the gaps that existed
shortly after the end of the War; and a black “middle class” comprised of workers in
professional and other skilled occupations emerged.   At the same time, the United States
today is very far from full economic equality between the races.  In relative terms
African-Americans today may be better off than their counterparts were just after the
Civil War, but racial gaps in income and, in particular, wealth, are still large in absolute
terms.
When slavery ended the vast majority of African-Americans became economic
participants in the “free market”.  In a truly free market a person’s income at any point in
time is determined by her skills or “human capital”; by ownership of physical capital;
and by factor prices (wages and the returns to capital). The United States economy was
not then, and certainly is not now, a free market in the pure sense.  But it was (and is)
enough of a free market that economic actions that blacks took as individuals in response
to economic incentives were central to the process of convergence.  As slaves, blacks
6could do relatively little to improve their lot; and, in the final analysis, were always at the
mercy of their owners.   As free workers, they could, and did, make decisions to invest in
human capital, accumulate wealth, and – perhaps most important – move from one place
to another. In doing so, they experienced gains in economic status that, in the long run,
outpaced those experienced by whites.
It is possible that racial convergence after Emancipation could have occurred
continuously – bit by bit, as it were, each successive generation of African-Americans
acquiring more wealth, more human capital, migrating in search of better economic
opportunities, and so on.  In certain respects this is exactly what did happen (Higgs
1977).  But, the bit-by-bit story needs to be modified by incorporating two crucial
features – the persistence of the prevailing ideology, alluded to earlier, and government.  
These two features are the third element of my big picture.
The racist ideology that accommodated slavery – that blacks were “inferior” –
certainly slowed the process of racial convergence.   The belief system resulted in
discrimination by whites against blacks in various ways in the private economy – for
example, by refusing to sell property to black farmers or to hire black workers.  
Sometimes, however, the desire to “keep blacks in their place” took a back seat to the
desire to make money.  When this occurred racial convergence was fostered
The reigning ideology also led whites to discriminate through the public sector --
again, in varying degrees and in various ways.   In the South this took the form of a
dizzying array of laws that enforced racial segregation in all aspects of public life – for
example, in the public schools – and by a general failure to adequately protect the private
property rights of African-Americans.   Discrimination in this sense was facilitated,
7particularly in the South, by “disenfranchisement” – preventing blacks from voting.   The
abrogation of black voting rights in the South took hold in the late nineteenth century and
remained largely entrenched until the passage of the Voting Rights Act in the 1960s.
Just as two separate worlds, black and white, were evolving, so too were two
separate economies, South and North.   In the South the ideology of racial inferiority
became a way of life, deeply entrenched and resistant to change.  In the North the same
ideology was active, but it was geared more towards residential segregation than
disenfranchisement and economic subjugation.  When the South emerged from the Civil
War its economy was in shambles, and it remained a poor, “backward” region relative to
the North for a long time after.  In the immediate aftermath of the War and, indeed, for
many years after, most ex-slaves and their descendants lived in the South, in spite of the
ideology and the grinding poverty.  Their economic fortunes were inextricably tied to
those of the region, always subject to the constraints imposed by the ideology.
This historical reality created the pre-conditions for racial convergence to be
discontinuous rather than continuous.   Discontinuities could occur when, because of
“shocks”, blacks decided to move in large numbers from the South, where incomes were
low, to the North, where incomes were high.  Discontinuities could also occur if the
prevailing ideology itself were forced to change.  
As I document, there is strong evidence that a significant component of long-run
racial convergence was discontinuous -- that is, it was concentrated in particular episodes
of time.  These episodes were four in number.     
The first episode coincides with the period that historians refer to as
Reconstruction, from the end of the Civil War to the late 1870s.  During this episode
8many of the worst aspects of the ideology were temporarily held in check by the federal
government’s efforts to “reconstruct” the ex-Confederacy.  Historical accounts of
Reconstruction often emphasize how the glass was only a quarter-full (or less) – that is,
how much more could (and should) have been done to ease the transition to a free labor
system.   One can agree that more could (and should) have been done, but the experience
of other post-slave societies suggests that far less might have been done.  
The second and third episodes coincide with the two World Wars.   The First
World War is an example of a shock-induced discontinuity.   The War temporarily
arrested the flow of European immigrants to Northern cities, creating a labor shortage
that was exacerbated by legislative restrictions on immigration that were enacted shortly
after the War.  This labor shortage was eased by migration from the South, including
blacks.  The extent of black migration from the South between 1910 and 1920 (and into
the 1920s) was far in excess of what would have been expected in the absence of World
War One or the cutoff in immigration.
The Second World War was a similar, if larger shock, but it also involved the first
serious attempts to change the belief system.   The War, and various interventions in the
economy by the federal government, altered national labor supplies and demands such
that wage differentials become “compressed”.  In particular, differences in wages
between skilled and unskilled, or more or less educated labor, declined substantially.  As
during World War One, blacks moved from the South to the North, but they also
benefited from the wage compression, because they were less skilled, and less educated,
on average, than white workers.  
9The ideology also began to come under attack in the 1940s.  In some respects, the
attack began earlier, notably in the case of school segregation at the state level. 
However, the role of the federal government was crucial.  The first attack came in the
form of an Executive Order issued by President Roosevelt that was aimed at mitigating
discrimination in defense employment.   It came under additional scrutiny later in the
decade under President Truman, progressed further in the 1950s, and then culminated in
the fourth episode during the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s.
The ideology of racial inferiority came under attack from a great many quarters
and for a great many reasons.   It involved many private and many public actors acting
with great personal and moral courage.  The point I wish to emphasize here is that some
of the public actors were politicians reacting in their self-interest.    Their self-interest
coincided with attacking the ideology because their political prosperity depended, in
some important way, on black votes.  As blacks began to move from the South to the
North, particularly in the aftermath of World War Two, they began to be “swing voters”.  
 As the horror stories of Southern Jim Crow began common knowledge in the North,
white sympathies in the North with the ideology were eroded.   The ideology was an
embarrassment internationally during the Cold War.  By the 1960s, if not earlier, no
person – in particular, no Southerner – seeking national office could adhere fully to the
ideology in public (in private was another matter) and be elected.  
In some places the system fought back hard or went underground.  But, in many
important public dimensions it simply gave way, first at the national level and then at the
state and local level.   The enactment of the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts at the
federal level, in particular, altered the rules of the game to such an extent that the
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ideology could not be maintained in its previous form.   As blacks began to vote, the
number of elected black officials, particularly in the South, rose dramatically.  At the
same time, economic conditions in Northern cities began to deteriorate.  Many blacks
that had previously migrated from the South became disenchanted with their lives in
Northern urban ghettos, and returned to the region.
The racial convergence that took place during the 1960s and early 1970s
eventually slowed.   While the causes of the slowdown have been much discussed, no
consensus has been reached in the scholarly literature.  Some scholars blame the
slowdown of convergence on fundamental changes in the American economy that have
reduced the demand for less-skilled labor in general, and black labor in particular. 
Others attribute the slowdown to various adverse developments that, allegedly, were
unintended consequences of the Great Society programs of the 1960s.  There is no
disagreement, however, that in its grossest forms, the institutional implementation of the
ideology that impinged upon African-American progress in the not-so-distant past is no
longer with us.  The economic challenges faced by African-Americans today are different
in degree and kind.
Standard economic models of discrimination take racial prejudice as given rather
than explain its origin or persistence.  But beliefs must originate; they must be nurtured –
as the song goes, “You must be carefully taught”.  Beliefs are passed on from one person
to another; and supported and reinforced by behavior; which may include codification
into law and other institutions.   Ideology can change, and government can, and does,
play a key role in changing them.  The “American Dilemma” illustrates this as well, and
perhaps better, than any other.  
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II.
At the turn of the twentieth century roughly 90 percent of African-Americans
lived in the South.  Per capita income in the South at the time was 51 percent of the
national average (Engerman 1971).  Although region was far from the only reason why
black incomes at the turn of the century were less than white incomes, region certainly
was a key reason.
Why was the South so poor at the turn of the century? One possibility is that it
was always thus, and “always thus” was a consequence of the “Peculiar Institution” -
slavery.  The South was poor because slavery made it so.
The argument has a long tradition in historical circles, and reputable economics to
back it up.  According to this view, slave labor cannot survive for very long in
competition with free labor.  Free labor is modern; slave labor, archaic – the forces of
“modernization” will eventually win the day.   Today’s apologists for the ante-bellum
South like this argument because it seems to suggest that the Civil War was unnecessary. 
Eventually, someday, slavery would have died out on its own.
The difficulty with the argument is that the hard evidence points in the opposite
direction.  For nearly five decades, economic historians have been intensively studying
the workings of the slave economy of the antebellum South.  Some of their results seem
unsurprising, but others are quite surprising indeed.
Slavery in the ante-bellum South was highly profitable (Conrad and Meyer 1958). 
Profitability here means simply that the rate of return on owning a slave exceeded the
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next best alternative investment.  Given the growth and obvious prosperity of the slave
economy, profitability is not so surprising.
Slavery in the ante-bellum South was also economically viable (Yasuba 1971). 
Viability means more than profitability; it means that it was economically rational for the
system to reproduce itself.  
Slavery could have been profitable, and even viable, because the slave owner, by
definition, can exploit the slave economically.  “Exploit” here is a technical economic
term: it means that the value of the slave’s economic contribution – the value of his
“marginal product” – exceeded the value of his maintenance costs – food, clothing,
shelter, and so on.
There is no question that exploitation in this sense occurred, but what is
surprising is the amount of exploitation does not seem sufficient to account for the level
of profitability.  Most economic historians believe that something deeper, and much more
insidious, made slavery profitable.
What made slavery profitable, according to this view, is that slave agriculture was
technically more efficient that free agriculture: using the same non-labor inputs (capital,
land, and so on), slave labor could produce more output per worker than free labor (Fogel
and Engerman 1974, 1979).  This is a finding that many scholars object to on moral
grounds, because it seems to suggest that there was something good about slavery.  But
there was nothing good about slavery, and the finding that slave labor was technically
efficient is not a statement in favor of the system.  
The evidence on profitability makes it clear that slave owners benefited from
slavery.  What technical efficiency implies is that consumers of the products of the slave
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economy also benefited from the system, because these products would have been more
expensive had they been produced using free labor.   These consumers were scattered
throughout the country, indeed all over Europe.
Technical efficiency was not a foregone conclusion.  It was achieved primarily
through the use of the “gang” system.  The gang system was to agriculture what the
factory system was to manufacturing.  In gang system agriculture, tasks were highly
specialized, there was much division of labor, and labor of all ages and both sexes was
utilized with ruthless effectiveness.  Free labor shunned the gang system: slavery was the
only way to reap its rents (Fogel 1989). 
The slave owner who wished to extract the full benefits of the gang system had,
first, to assemble a gang – at least 15 productive slaves.  The labor had to be extracted
from the slaves with a delicate balance of sticks and carrots.  Too much of the stick – the
whip, and other punishments – and the extra profits could vanish with sabotage or merely
a slowdown in work effort undetected by the slave driver or the owner.  Too little of the
carrot – inadequate food – and the same could occur.
None of this is meant to imply that slaves were well-treated in an absolute sense,
because they were not.  At best, the typical slave received an allotment of basic
necessities that, on average, was roughly comparable to that received by poor, unskilled
free labor (Fogel and Engerman 1974).  But slave labor was seriously disadvantaged in
other ways (Fogel 1989).
Slave labor was almost wholly illiterate labor.  This was, of course, true of some
free labor at the time, but rates of illiteracy among slaves were vastly higher than
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corresponding rates among free labor.  Merely teaching a slave to read or write was a
crime.  The literate slave was feared for one, simple reason – he could revolt.  
Slave labor was generally unskilled labor.  There has been a long-run dispute over
the precise level of skills embodied in the slave population.  The debate persists because
it is clear that black labor was grossly under-represented in skilled and professional
occupations at the end of the nineteenth century.  The issue is whether the under-
representation was a product of slavery or of a later era.  But even the most optimistic
estimates clearly imply that most adult male slaves, in particular, held unskilled
occupations, chiefly in agriculture.
Slave labor was dirt poor.  Most slaves, except in a very limited sense, possessed
no private property, and had little or no means to accumulate any – and, it goes without
saying, pass on property to their descendants, who were slaves at birth.
While slavery generated benefits for slave owners and consumers of the products
of the slave economy, it did little economically for the slaves.   It was extremely difficult
for a slave to accumulate human capital or physical wealth.   The hallmark of the
antebellum economy was a high rate of geographic and occupational mobility among free
labor.  Free labor could, and did, migrate where the returns to labor were highest (Margo
2000).   Slave owners moved, or sold, their chattel to capture higher returns, but these
returns did not accrue to the slave.
Lastly, and most importantly, there is no evidence that slavery would have died
out on economic grounds on the eve of the American Civil War.  Indeed, the tenacity of
the South in resisting the abolitionist movement, and the fierceness of its resistance to the
Union Army, is testament to the economic importance of slavery.  On the eve of the Civil
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War, most southerners were not slave owners, but many who were not were willing to die
to preserve the “Southern way of life”—which, at the time, included slavery -- for current
and future generations of white Southerners. 
III.
The Civil War ended in 1865 and with it the enforced slavery of millions of
African-Americans.  Measuring the extent and timing of racial convergence since
Emancipation is difficult.  Not until 1940 did the federal census include a question in
incomes.  The censuses of 1850, 1860, and 1870 did include questions on wealth, but
there were no similar questions in subsequent censuses.  Enough evidence survives,
however, to piece together to a reasonably reliable and reasonably complete picture of
change over time.
Estimates of per capita black incomes in the immediate aftermath of the Civil
War have been made by Robert Higgs (1977).  Higgs’ estimates are based primarily on
contemporaneous reports of agricultural incomes.  According to Higgs, the black-white
income ratio in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War – was approximately 0.25.
The low level of the black-white income ratio in the immediate aftermath of the
Civil War is not very surprising.   As noted in the previous section, the typical ex-slave
was illiterate and had very few occupational skills.  The American economy of 1870 was
not yet one in which educated labor played a large role, but it was an economy that
nevertheless paid a wage premium for literate, educated labor and it was an economy
1 Computed from Table P.3 in www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc.
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which paid a wage premium for skilled labor.  But these are not the only factors that
affected the wage ratio just after the Civil War.
The South experienced a sharp decline in per capita income after the Civil War,
one of the few instances of such declines in American history, outside of the Great
Depression (Engerman 1971; Goldin 1979).   This decline was manifested in a sharp
reduction in nominal and real wages in South, absolutely and relative to nominal and real
wages outside the region (Margo, forthcoming).    This decline was a consequence of a
number of factors, chief among them a decline in labor demand.  The gang system, which
had elevated labor productivity in Southern agriculture before the War (on the backs of
slave workers) disappeared after the War.  Output per worker fell sharply in agriculture,
one manifestation of which was a decline in wages.   The vast majority of blacks in 1870
were ex-slaves living in rural areas of the South, engaged in agricultural activity.  
However, the majority of whites were not.    Another reasons why the black-white
income ratio was so low in, 1870, then, was because so many blacks remained in the
South, an issue that I will return to later in the chapter.  
Racial income convergence has occurred since the end of the Civil War.  The
most recently available estimate of the black-white per capita income ratio by the United
States Census Bureau, for 2001, is 0.62.1   
Wealth differences have also converged between blacks and whites over the long
haul.  As just noted, the 1870 recorded major elements of personal and real wealth. 
These data refer to gross, not net wealth (that is, they are not adjusted for debt holdings),
and the 1870 census is widely believed to have been one of the poorer in quality of the
nineteenth century.  According to these data, the black-white wealth ratio in 1870 was a
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scant 0.025 – that is, for every dollar of wealth held by whites, blacks held 2.5 cents
(Pope 2000).  The vast majority of adult black men listed in the census reported that they
owned no wealth at all.
Today, the Federal Reserve periodically conducts household-level surveys of
wealth.  Here, the data pertain to net worth (assets minus liabilities) which can, of course,
be negative (unlike gross wealth).  The Federal Reserve data are far more comprehensive
than those collected in the nineteenth century, and the scientific sampling methods ensure
that the sample statistics – for example, medians or averages – are the best available
estimates of population parameters.  According to the most recent analysis of such data,
the black-white wealth ratio in the mid-1990s was 0.16, approximately a seven-fold
increase since 1870 (Wolff 1998).
Racial convergence in education has also occurred in the long run.  Data on
“years of schooling” or “highest grade completed” were first collected in 1940.  It is
possible to use the 1940 data to “back-cast” estimates of racial differences in schooling
for the nineteenth century, but this entails assuming that elderly persons (for example,
someone born in 1860) who survived until 1940 was representative of their birth cohort. 
The 1870 census, however, collected data on literacy for persons aged ten and
over.  These, like nearly all census data, were self-reported.  There exists survey evidence
that suggests that, on average, exposure to a limited amount of formal schooling – as
little as one to two years – was sufficient for a person to declare themselves “literate” to
the census taker.  The opposite, therefore – illiteracy – can be taken as an indicator of
very little or no formal schooling.
2 According to the March 2002 Current Population Survey, 79 percent of black men over the age of 25 held
high school or higher degrees, compared with 89 percent of whites; see www.census.gov.
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In 1870, 13 percent of whites aged 10 and over nationwide reported themselves as
illiterate.  This figure was higher in the South, but even in the South, the overwhelming
majority of whites were literate.  Not so, however, among African-Americans: nationally,
the black illiteracy rate was 81 percent.  The national rate for blacks was virtually the
same as the rate for the South (83 percent), because the overwhelming majority of blacks
in 1870 lived in the South.
The census no longer collects data on literacy, having substituted a question on
educational attainment in 1940.   These data have been periodically modified since 1940,
and are not really comparable to the literacy data.  However, while blacks still lag behind
whites in educational attainment, there is no question that the gap is vastly smaller than
existed in the past century.2  These data do not adjust for “school quality” and there is
widespread belief that the quality of schooling received by African-Americans falls short,
on average, of the quality received by whites.   However, the same was true in the past,
and thus adjusting for school quality would not alter the conclusion that racial differences
in educational attainment have narrowed substantially since 1870.
In sum, a variety of evidence, including much that I have not surveyed here,
points to long-term convergence in economic outcomes between blacks and whites. 
Nonetheless, we live in a county in which racial gaps in income, wealth, and other
measures of economic “success” are still very large in absolute terms.  Measured in terms
of equality, rather than convergence, the most has been achieved in schooling, and the
least in wealth, with income in between.
19
Indeed, while proportionately more convergence took place in wealth than
income, the fact remains that the racial wealth gap today is extremely large.  Why this is
so is currently a topic of considerable interest among economists and other social
scientists.  Racial differences in income, rates of return, and demographic factors play a
role, but much of the difference appears to be due to a lesser rate of intergenerational
transfers among blacks as well as racial differences in portfolio structure (Blau and
Graham 1990).
IV.
In the preceding section I showed that long-term racial convergence in income,
education, and wealth has occurred since the end of the Civil War.   But I did not
consider whether the convergence that took place did so continuously, or episodically –
that is, in spurts.
In “theory” convergence might have taken place continuously.  The theory here is
quite simple.  Under slavery, blacks faced extraordinary difficulty accumulating human
capital and physical wealth.  This left them under-endowed with both types of capital at
the end of the Civil War.  With slavery gone, the economic fortunes of blacks were tied
to the market economy, and the market paid positive returns to human capital and
physical wealth.  Ex-slaves, therefore, had especially strong incentives to acquire wealth,
human and non-human – incentives that, at the margin, almost certainly exceeded those
of whites. Moreover, blacks no longer faced the virtually binding constraints on upward
mobility that slavery imposed upon them.   Provided that rates of return to these activities
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did not differ fundamentally by race, convergence would take place – indeed, until
equality was achieved.   
Even under this ideal scenario, convergence would not have happened over night,
because the required investment was huge.  Absent the ability to borrow, the opportunity
cost of investing in physical capital is today’s consumption.  Investment in human
capital, takes time, and the opportunity cost of time spent investing in human capital is
time spent working, which also translates directly into today’s consumption. But
convergence would nevertheless have been steady.
There are reasons to question the “steady as it goes” story on a priori grounds. 
For example, the American economy has always been beset by ups and downs – the
business cycle.  Typically, the poor bear the brunt when the economy turns sour.  
Periodic recessions, in other words, must have slowed the convergence process – and,
indeed, there is good evidence this was so for the post-World War II period as well as the
biggest downturn of them all, the Great Depression.  But the upside of a recession is a
boom, and during a boom, the economic prospects of lower income workers would get a
boost.  But these are movements around a trend, not the trend itself.  And the trend –
convergence – is positive.   Business cycle shifts in relative black economic fortunes
cannot be the full story of long-term convergence.
A much deeper qualification is that the “free market” does not exist
independently of the institutions that support it, notably, those associated with the
definition and protection of private property.   Wealth accumulation means little if wealth
can be easily stolen or destroyed, and victims unable to procure justice or recover
damages.  Human capital accumulation means little if individuals are at daily risk of
21
bodily harm.   The responsibility for defining and ensuring the protection of private
property rests primarily, if not exclusively, with the public sector.  A governmental
failure to adequately protect life, limb, and physical property of individuals dampens
their incentives to invest, and in the limit, might thwart economic growth altogether.
A second, equally deep qualification is that the ideology of black inferiority
impinged upon the process of convergence.   In one of the standard economic models of
discrimination, one group – the “majority” – is said to have “tastes for discrimination” or
prejudice against another group, the “minority” (Becker 1957).   These tastes generally
will differ across members of the majority – some may be without prejudice, others may
be rabidly biased.  If members of the majority group act upon their prejudices, certain
“gains from trade” between the two groups will not be realized.  The extent of the
deadweight loss depends on, among other factors, the precise distribution of prejudice
across the majority.   If the discrimination is severe enough, convergence will be slowed
considerably and perhaps stopped altogether.
The gains from trade just spoken of refer to private market transactions.  But
“government” can be harnessed in support of the majority’s prejudices.  If, motivated by
prejudice, a member of the majority commits a criminal act against a member of the
minority – a whipping, for example – and no action is taken against the perpetrator, the
government has failed to protect private property rights.   Government might outlaw
certain types of exchanges between the two groups – for example, marriage, or
residential integration – that again, can result in so-called “deadweight losses”.   One can
also imagine a model of government discrimination in which the government imposes
taxes on the minority, and redistributes the proceeds to majority (Margo 1991)
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Then, as now, the United States was made up of governments at several levels,
and the ability of any one of them to discriminate was partly dependent on the actions of
other governments at the same level (if any), and whether higher level of governments (if
any) constrained the behavior of lower levels of governments.  What other governments
at the same level do matters if members of the minority group are mobile across
jurisdictional boundaries, and if “voting with one’s feet” imposes  costs on the majority
(Margo 1991).   Today, a local government could never impose a law that discriminated
against blacks for purely racial purposes (that is, motivated by racial animus) simply
because such a law would be deemed unconstitutional, either by a state or federal court,
on its face, and the court order would be enforced.  But this was not the case historically
(see below).
Most directly, the ability to harness the government to discriminate is contingent
on the majority’s political clout relative to the minority.  If the minority can vote, and
their votes in the aggregate matter enough to the political support of the government, the
majority may fail in its quest.  Disenfranchisement of the minority is neither a necessary
nor sufficient condition for government discrimination to exist.  It is not a necessary
condition because the votes may not matter to the government, and there may be
insufficient safeguards elsewhere to prevent the discrimination from taking place.  It is
not a sufficient condition because certain types of discrimination might impose economic
harm on the majority in excess of whatever the majority gains in satisfaction from seeing
its prejudices exercised; or, if the discrimination is imposed at lower level, and there are
members of the minority less prejudiced (or without prejudice) elsewhere, and these
engage a higher level of government to stop the discrimination by the lower level
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government.  These caveats are important in theory as well as in fact; however, there is
no question that disenfranchisement can facilitate government discrimination if the other
fundamentals are in place.
Slavery did not survive the Civil War, but the ideology of black inferiority that
justified slavery in the eyes of slaveholders (and many who were not) certainly did.  
Indeed, it would have suited former slaveholders just fine if the Peculiar Institution could
have somehow been reconstituted after the War in its essential elements, and blacks
“kept in their place”.  But it was interest of the Union to see the ex-Confederacy
“Reconstructed”.  Without question, blacks benefited from Reconstruction, most
importantly, with the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution (in
1868) and the establishment of public schools for black children in the South after the
War.
This is far from saying that Reconstruction was an unmitigated blessing for
blacks (Foner 1988).  Clearly, more could have been done – for example, some measure
of land redistribution (“forty acres and a mule”) might have gone a long ways toward
rectifying the terrible wealth deficit after the War.  However, it is also possible that less
could have been done. The history of other post-slave societies suggests that this
alternative scenario is not far-fetched (Engerman, Haber, and Sokoloff 2000).
Reconstruction formally ended in 1877 but the processes it put in place continued
for some time thereafter and, in the case of schools, were permanent.   There is clear
evidence of racial convergence in wealth from 1870 to shortly after the turn of the
century.  This evidence comes from reports conducted by state authorities in various
southern states that divided up taxable wealth by race.  These reports show that taxable
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wealth per adult black male increased more rapidly than among whites, with one
exception (Higgs 1982; Margo 1984).  For example, in Georgia in 1880, the black-white
ratio of per capita (taxable) wealth stood at 0.028 – 2.8 cents of taxable wealth per black
person for every dollar held by whites. By 1910, the ratio was 0.063 (Higgs 1982).  This
evidence is complemented by other data from census reports documenting substantial
growth in the proportion of black farmers who were owner-operators by the turn of the
century (Higgs 1977).
Even more impressive is the substantial reduction in black illiteracy rates that
occurred after 1870.   This reduction shows up most dramatically among post-Civil War
birth cohorts, the first to have widespread access to formal schooling.  Hence the point
made earlier – if public schools for blacks had not been a key component of the effort to
reconstruct the South, black illiteracy rates would have continued to be astronomical for
a long time after the War (Collins and Margo 2003).
In the aftermath of Reconstruction the South underwent a major detour in its
racial politics.   In particular, beginning in the 1880s in some states and largely complete
by the early twentieth century, a number of southern states effectively disenfranchised
the black population along with many poor whites (Kousser 1974).  The
disenfranchisement era was also associated with rise of “Jim Crow”, the legislative
embodiment of segregation (Woodward 1955).  Taken to absurd lengths, segregation
infected every nook and cranny of Southern life.   
The disfranchisement era also witnessed a substantial deterioration in the relative
amount of resources provided to black schools in the South (Margo 1990).  Prior to
disenfranchisement, there was a rough sort of racial equality to the schools, but once
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disenfranchisement took hold, resources per black pupil relative to resources per white
pupil took a dive.
The rise of Jim Crow also coincided with a general deterioration in the security of
black property rights.  Nothing illustrates this better than the extraordinary cruelty of
Southern lynch mobs, who imposed their own form of punishment on black men rather
then let the justice system run its course.  Newspaper and other accounts record
thousands of black men who met their makers at the hands of such mobs.  The exact
number will never be known.
To avoid summary justice, or a beating, or a burning cross, blacks in the South
had to follow a code of behavior that acquiesced to the ideology of inferiority.  Even this
might not be enough, so it paid to have a powerful white as a patron.  We are now so far
from this era, and this type of society that it is difficult to comprehend – impossible,
really, for a white person – the kind of day-to-day accommodations in behavior that
blacks had to make just to survive.  
The combination of disfranchisement, Jim Crow, and increased educational
discrimination appears to have slowed the pace of racial convergence in incomes to a
crawl prior to World War One.  As I have noted several times already, the South was
very poor at the turn of the century (Wright 1986).    Blacks who desired a better life and
who remained in the South faced a difficult, if not exactly impossible, uphill battle.
One of the more puzzling features of African-American history is the continued
presence of large numbers of blacks in the South after the Civil War, especially after
their political fortunes took a turn for the worse.  Why didn’t more blacks leave the
South, especially since there appear to have been substantial gains in real incomes?
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This is a question that economic historians have written about for years, and there
are many answers on the table.  One answer claims that a “North Atlantic labor market”
developed during the nineteenth century, in which the Northern United States and
Western Europe participated.  As the North continued to industrialize, it drew its
manufacturing workers from the pool of available talent in this labor market.   The South
might have joined, too, but it was busy – first defending slavery, and secondly, fighting
its own battles during Reconstruction.  Once the labor market was established, according
to this story, it was difficult for outsiders to break in, unless some type of shock occurred
(Wright 1986)
Another story points out that migrants from the South, black or white, tended to
be much better educated than those who stayed behind.  The South lagged substantially
behind the rest of the nation in education.  This story suggests that, over time, more
blacks should have left the South, as convergence in schooling took place.   There is clear
evidence of this in the census data, but there is also clear evidence of the importance of
shock-induced migration (Margo 1990; Collins 1997).
The first shock was World War One.   During the war the demand for
manufacturing labor in the North increased, but the usual supply of European immigrants
was interrupted.  The interruption subsided at war’s end, but Congress followed with the
implementation of quotas in 1924.  Blacks migrated to take advantage during the
interruption.  Once the flow started, it appears to have sustained itself.  Most of the
migration was to select cities, and in these cities black “ghettos” emerged.  Some cities
erupted in race riots (such as St. Louis), initiated by whites angry over the black influx. 
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It is difficult to prove directly that the shock-induced migration of World War
One led to discontinuous change in black-white income ratios because the requisite data
are lacking.   But the circumstantial evidence is strong, because southern wages were far
lower than northern wages, and the evidence of a discontinuous jump in black migration
from the South is compelling (Collins 1997).
World War Two was another shock, far bigger in size and in its long run
implications than was World War One.  Large numbers of blacks left the rural South (as
did whites), settling in Southern cities, or more often than not, cities outside the region,
including many who moved to the far West.  Here, the evidence for discontinuous change
in migration is very strong, as is the evidence of discontinuous convergence in incomes. 
Indeed, virtually all of the convergence in black-white income differences that occurred
after 1940 occurred in two periods, one of which was the 1940s (Donohue and Heckman
1991).
The 1940s witnessed the “Great Compression”, a substantial reduction in the
degree of wage inequality, manifested by a decline in the returns to schooling and a
narrowing of wage differentials between skilled and unskilled occupations (Goldin and
Margo 1992).  Blacks benefited disproportionately from the Great Compression because
at its start (1940) there were disproportionately low-wage workers (Margo 1995).  The
Compression had many causes, but among them was direct intervention by the Federal
Government in the form of wage controls.  Shifts in wartime demand also favored low-
wage labor, as did shifts in labor supply (that is, the draft).  Unlike a similar compression
during World War On, that of the 1940s remained in place largely intact well after the
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War ended, and thus the gains experienced by blacks due to the compression were
sustained as well.
The 1940s also witnessed an important attack by the Federal Government on the
ideology of racial inferiority.   It is true that the ideology had already been under attack
from many quarters prior to the 1940s but the Federal role was significant: only the
Federal Government possessed the ability, in principle, to enforce implementation of
anti-discrimination regulations on a nationwide basis.  In 1943, Franklin Roosevelt issued
an “executive order” barring discrimination in defense hiring.   At the same time an
agency was set up, the Fair Employment Practices Committee.  The FEPC did not have
the ability to punish violators by, say, putting them in jail or with fines, but they could
conduct hearings, which could bring adverse publicity.  Recent work by the economic
historian William Collins (2001) has shown that, contrary to received wisdom, the FEPC
was effective in getting blacks hired in defense industries.  These employment gains were
sustained after the War, and, because these industries paid above-average wages, were
important in generating the disproportionate wage gains experienced by blacks in the
1940s.  
As more blacks moved to the North, they were able to exact more political
pressure on government to intervene on their behalf.  State governments began to pass
“fair employment laws”.  These laws do not seem to have had much effect, but they
nevertheless created important precedents for national legislation (Collins 2003).   Blacks
in Northern cities became important “swing voters” in national elections.  It is no
accident that Harry Truman, who benefited from such swing votes in the 1948 election,
was a proponent of anti-discrimination legislation.  But significant change at the national
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level was held up for many years in the Senate by senators from the South, who opposed
racial change, particularly in matters of integration.
The attack on the ideology of racial inferiority continued in the 1950s.  In 1954,
the Supreme Court ruled that “separate-but-equal” public schools were unconstitutional,
the culmination of a long series of court battles and social activism.   The order of the
court was, however, to be implemented with “all deliberate speed” because the white
South was very far from ready to accept integration from above.  
The emergence of a Civil Rights Movement in the 1950s, which reached a zenith
with the March on Washington in 1963, and Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream
Speech” coincided with the national ascendancy of the political career of Lyndon
Johnson.  Johnson wanted the presidency, but knew by the late 1940s that he could never
be elected if he toed the strict segregationist party line – by that time, he would never win
enough votes outside the South.  He first achieved passage of federal civil rights
legislation in 1957 while in the Senate, but his crowning achievements were as president
with the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, and the Voting Rights Act in 1965.   In
an executive order issued in 1965, Johnson also establishment the principle of
“affirmative action”, whose implementation has been a subject of controversy ever since.
Did the sea change in the federal government’s role make a difference? Recent
work by the labor economists John Donohue and James Heckman strongly suggest that it
did.  Donohue and Heckman (1991) show that, at the national level, the period from 1963
to 1975 coincided with a substantial convergence in black-white income ratios.  Upon
further scrutiny, however, it is clear that most of the convergence occurred in the South. 
Donohue and Heckman point out that much of the initial enforcement of federal anti-
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discrimination legislation was targeted at the South; even so, however, the extent of the
enforcement seems relatively puny compared with the apparent gains experienced by
blacks.
Donohue and Heckman resolve the puzzle in two ways.  First, at least some
elements in Southern white society wanted to change, including many in business. 
Racism gave the South a bad image in the rest of the country, and in the rest of the world,
and a bad image was bad for business. In public, the external impetus to change was
deeply resented by many in the region but cooler heads realized that the change served a
useful purpose.
Second, Johnson’s executive order had perfect timing.  During the post-World
War Two period the South received a disproportionate share of defense spending. 
Defense spending, by its very nature, is federal contracting. Heckman and Payner (1989)
examine the specific case of the South Carolina textile industry.  The industry labor force
was virtually entirely white, and had been for decades, but this was hardly true of the
state.  Yet the industry suddenly began to hire black workers after 1965.  Nothing had
changed, except for the executive order and the fact that many firms in the industry were
federal contractors during the Vietnam War.   In the late 1960s racism no longer paid,
and black-white income differences narrowed accordingly.
The changes in the 1960s were, with hindsight, unprecedented, but they did not
come fast enough nor complete enough to satisfy many African-Americans.   An
incredible number of American cities erupted in race riots in the 1960s, many after the
assassination of Martin Luther King in April of 1968.  A recent econometric analysis
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suggests that the riots had negative effects on black labor market outcomes (Collins and
Margo 2004).    
The dramatic convergence associated with the Civil Rights Era slowed in the mid-
1970s.  Beginning in the late 1970s and picking up steam during the Reagan
Administration, an ensuing debate in the courts over affirmative action and other federal
anti-discrimination efforts did not lead to the reversal of the policies, but there is no
question that their reach has been circumscribed.   The opportunities the emerged in the
wake of the Civil Rights Movement have been seized by upon by many blacks eager for
economic advancement, and their fruits can be seen in all walks of American life.  But
those who have been left behind are also visible, in the form of high crime rates in inner
cities, drug-related violence, and unemployment (Wilson 1987).   These problems are
exacerbated further by the continued high levels of residential segregation in many
American cities (Cutler and Glaeser 1997).  Black incomes have also been adversely
affected by increasing wage inequality in the labor market, whose origins rest with skill-
biased technical change and declines in the demand for manufacturing labor.
V.
In 1944 the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal published his monumental two
volume study, The American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and American Democracy. 
Page after page of Myrdal’s work recounted the consequences of racism and the
profound paradoxes that racism raised in light of the Constitution.  How could a country
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committed to the ideals expressed in the Constitution tolerate the abuses of human rights
that black Americans faced, day in and day out?
Racism still exists but its grossest, vilest forms, so evident to Myrdal, have been
banished from American public life.  African-Americans today still have lower incomes
and far less wealth and are more often unemployed than their white counterparts; their
life expectancies are lower; they have more health problems; more stress.  These
differences are a still a challenge for the United States.  The American dilemma is not
over.
Yet there has unquestionably been change for the better, over the long sweep of
American history since Emancipation.   We have had convergence at all, first and
foremost, because slavery was abolished, and because during the immediate aftermath of
slavery, a variety of safeguards put in place and enforced by the federal government, took
hold.
But government has been a fickle partner in the process of racial convergence.   It
was the institutions of American government in the first place that maintained slavery for
as long as it existed.  It is, of course, possible that a peaceful solution – peaceful
emancipation, perhaps with compensation to slave owners – might have been worked out,
but there is no reason to believe, on economic grounds, that slavery would have died out
peacefully on the eve of the American Civil War.  
In the aftermath of slavery the federal government maintained its presence in the
South for a while, but eventually it left, where African-Americans soon faced the brunt of
the region’s racism.   Geographic mobility – the market – offered some protection against
discrimination and exploitation, but there is no question that, in the South, the
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government was an ally to whites who wished to keep blacks “in their place”.  Around
the turn of the century the disenfranchisement movement in the South effectively
banished blacks from the electorate.   Segregation became a way of life in the South, a
way of life that many in the region were extremely reluctant to give up, to the point of
violence.
Although blacks began to leave the South as soon as they were able, the flow was
never very large until the two World Wars greatly speeded up the process of out-
migration.  Black migrants faced a great many challenges in the urban North, but at least
they had the benefit of higher incomes.  As black communities were established in
Northern cities, the political landscape began to change, and black votes became valuable
as swing votes.  Black political clout increased over time, receiving another boost with
the passage of federal voting rights legislation in the 1960s, part of a wave of federal
anti-discrimination legislation in the 1960s.  This legislation unquestionably improved
the lives of many African-Americans, and the timing of the legislation coincides with an
episode of convergence in incomes.   But, while some racial gaps now seem quite small,
others still are very large, notably in wealth.
The fickleness of the government was not random.  Government was, and is, a
conduit for the public expression of the prevailing ideology of race in American society. 
When the prevailing ideology favored racial discrimination, it was in the interest of many
politicians to accommodate the ideology.  When the prevailing ideology changed, so did
the incentives of politicians. Nevertheless, while public expressions of racism by
politicians, once very common, are no longer permissible in American public life,
America is still a country with a large racial divide in private.   There are signs of a thaw
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– for example, in rates of intermarriage – but true racial integration in the United States is
far off in the future, if ever.  
I began this essay by noting that, in comparison with most countries through the
history of the world, “good government” has been a hallmark of American history.  But,
by its very nature, government is coercion.  Americans have not been immune to the
temptations of using the coercive powers of the state for immoral ends.  Change was
often very slow in coming, and there were many reversals but, in the final analysis, the
racist ideology that accommodated slavery and that festered in its aftermath gave way.  
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